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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Previous research examining the preference-categorization effect shows that 
people make finer categorical distinctions for liked (vs. disliked) objects. This includes 
people’s evaluative ratings using likert-type rating scales. While previous research has 
focused on consumer products, the current research examined whether findings from the 
preference-categorization effect apply to how individuals rate other people. Experiment 
1 provided initial evidence that the preference-categorization effect applies to 
interpersonal ratings by showing that people prefer more evaluative scale points when 
rating liked (vs. disliked) others. Experiment 2a, 2b, and 2c replicated this effect using 
in-group and out-group members and pre-constructed rating scales to eliminate 
vocabulary knowledge as a possible confound. Additionally, these studies found mixed 
evidence that duration of in-group membership and in-group identity influence the 
preference-categorization effect. Experiment 2a found that the longer a person has been 
a member of the in-group, the stronger they display the preference-categorization effect. 
Experiment 2c showed that the stronger a person’s in-group identity, the more scale 
points they preferred when rating in-group members. However, these findings were not 
replicated in the other current studies. Furthermore, these studies found no relationship 
between scale selection and other group identity measures, affect, or need for cognition. 
Experiment 3 examined the relationship between the preference-categorization effect 
and out-group homogeneity effect. Although there was evidence of both of these effects, 
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no relationship was found between the two measures.  Together, these studies suggest a 
preference-categorization effect for ratings of group members in that people prefer more 
rating scale points when rating both liked (vs. disliked) and in-group (vs. out-group) 
members.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
People use rating scales almost every day, whether they are evaluating the 
movies they watch, the products they buy, or the restaurants they dine in. Usually, 
customers use the same evaluative scale regardless of whether they like or dislike the 
product they are rating. However, prior research suggests that people may prefer 
different evaluative scales depending on their preferences (e.g., how much they like vs. 
dislike something). Some research suggests that people prefer more evaluative scale 
points when rating liked items compared to disliked items (Smallman & Becker, in prep; 
Smallman & Becker, in press; Smallman, Becker, & Roese, 2014). It is plausible that 
this effect may also apply to how individuals rate other people. Though the evaluation of 
others may typically be more informal or implicit (e.g., people watching or first 
impressions), we are sometimes called to make more formal assessments of other 
individuals (e.g., students completing course evaluations of their professors or 
businesses conducting performance appraisals of employees). The current research 
examines whether people prefer the same number of evaluative scale points when rating 
liked versus disliked individuals and in-group versus out-group members. 
There has been extensive research on the number of evaluative rating points 
necessary for measuring attitudes, with the general consensus that 5 to 7 scale points 
provide the adequate amount of reliability (Garner, 1960; Komorita & Graham, 1965; 
Weng, 2004). Additionally, some research shows that these scales should be bipolar and 
balanced with equal responses on either side of a neutral midpoint (Himmelfarb, 1993; 
Krosnick, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2005). These studies focus on the psychometric 
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properties of scale construction, but we should also consider the types of evaluative 
scales customers want based on their preferences. Recent research shows that a person’s 
affective appraisal of objects influences the kind of evaluative scale they would prefer to 
use when rating those objects. That is, people prefer a different number of rating scale 
points depending on whether they are rating liked or disliked objects. Termed the 
preference-categorization effect (Smallman & Becker, in prep; Smallman & Becker, in 
press; Smallman et al., 2014; Smallman & Roese, 2008), participants see more 
distinctions among items, create more nuanced groupings, and prefer more differentiated 
evaluative scales when interacting with liked (vs. disliked) objects.  
Previously, the preference-categorization effect has been examined using a 
variety of consumer products (e.g., music, food, movies, and clothing). The current 
research applies these findings to how individuals rate other people. Prior research from 
the out-group homogeneity effect (OHE) and cross-race effect (CRE) finds that 
individuals see out-group members as more similar to each other than in-group members 
(Jones, Wood, & Quattrone, 1981; Mullen & Hu, 1989). Connecting those findings to 
the preference-categorization effect, I hypothesized that people would prefer more 
differentiated evaluative scales when rating liked or in-group members compared to 
disliked or out-group members.  
1.1 The Preference-Categorization Effect: Traditional and Evaluative 
 The preference-categorization effect states that individuals make more nuanced 
distinctions for preferred objects (Smallman & Becker, in prep; Smallman & Becker, in 
press; Smallman et al., 2014; Smallman & Roese, 2008). Thus, when asked to sort 
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objects into categories, people create more nuanced categories for liked (vs. disliked) 
objects (Smallman & Roese, 2008). For example, a wine lover would probably 
categorize wines into styles, region, vineyards, and vintages. However, someone who 
hates wine may only see them as reds or whites. In addition to categorizing liked and 
disliked objects differently, people prefer more scale points on an evaluative scale (e.g., 
likert rating scales) when rating liked (vs. disliked) objects. For example, a romantic 
comedy fan rating romantic comedies would prefer to use a scale with many evaluative 
scale points (e.g., a 5-star rating scale with “Okay”, “Good”, “Really Good”, “Great”, 
and “Best”).  Conversely, a person who hates romantic comedies would only need a few 
scale points to express their opinion (e.g., a 2-star rating scale with “Bad” and “Worst” 
as point labels). 
The link between preference and categorization seems to be, in part, driven by 
the pleasure people get from engaging with their preferences. Pleasurable feelings 
encourage individuals to engage repeatedly with their preferences, and this repeated 
exposure increases the pleasure one gets from their preferences. This mechanism is 
supported by the Law of Effect, which states that people repeatedly engage in behaviors 
that are rewarded (Thorndike, 1898), and more contemporary research, which shows that 
these rewards include subjective feelings of positive affect (Carver, 2003; Gable & 
Harmon-Jones, 2008). Additionally, repeated exposure may result in greater liking (e.g., 
the Mere Exposure Effect; Zajonc, 1968). Thus, the positive feelings individuals get 
from their preferences may lead them to engage repeatedly with their preferences and 
repeated exposure to preferences may result in greater liking of preferred objects.  
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Eventually, this repetitive engagement may then lead to greater elaboration of preferred 
objects.  
Elaboration is an effortful process that occurs when individuals evaluate and 
integrate attitude-relevant ideas (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Subsequently, elaboration of 
preferences may allow individuals to make more nuanced distinctions between items in 
their preferred categories. For example, a craft beer fanatic may be able to classify their 
favorite beers by brewery, style, and the types of hops used in the brewing process. 
Thus, preference may increase elaboration of details and ability to see nuanced 
distinctions in those preferences. However, dislike for an activity or object may create 
the illusion of similarity due to lack of elaboration. For example, a person who hates 
beer probably could not make the same elaborative distinctions as the beer fanatic; it is 
all just beer. This inability to make distinctions may therefore lead to perceived 
similarity of disliked objects, thus less need for finer evaluative distinctions.  
Support for the role of elaboration in both traditional and evaluative 
categorization comes from research looking at individual’s intrinsic motivation for 
effortful cognitive activity or need for cognition (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; 
Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). High NFC individuals enjoy effortful 
processing and engage in it with or without external motivation (Taylor, 1981). 
However, low NFC individuals need external motivation to engage in similar levels of 
effortful processing (Amabile, Hill, Hennessey, & Tighe, 1994; Thompson, Chaiken, & 
Hazlewood, 1993). While the preference-categorization effect shows that people prefer 
more evaluative scale points for liked (vs. disliked) objects, Smallman et al. (2014) 
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found that high NFC participants, who are intrinsically motivated to think elaborately, 
wanted a similar number of rating-scale points for both liked and disliked food 
categories. However, low NFC participants, who need extrinsic motivation to think in an 
elaborative manner, demonstrated the expected preference-categorization effect. This is 
possibly due to the lack of motivation to think in an elaborative manner about disliked 
objects. Low NFC participants can engage in elaborative processing, but this only occurs 
when they are externally motivated by positive affect. High NFC participants, 
conversely, think elaborately about all objects, liked or disliked. Similar results were 
found using a traditional categorization task (i.e., sorting items into groups). Participants 
listed the items they would expect to see in their liked or disliked food category. High 
NFC participants showed no difference in the number of category items listed for liked 
and disliked cuisine, but low NFC participants listed significantly more items in the like 
(vs. dislike) condition.  
One might argue that expertise may contribute to the ability to make nuanced 
distinctions, and there is some evidence supporting this. Expertise has been shown to 
induce more nuanced categorization and differentiation based on deeper, rather than 
surface level, features (Chi, Feltrovich, & Glaser, 1981; Medin, Lynch, Coley, & Atran, 
1997; Rota & Zellner, 2007).  However, studies have shown that the preference-
categorization effect can occur independently of expertise (Smallman & Roese, 2008). 
As a preliminary demonstration, Smallman and Roese (2008) used an affect-based 
associative conditioning paradigm to create novel preferences in a laboratory setting. 
Participants viewed affectively neutral symbols (i.e., hieroglyphs and hobo symbols) 
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paired with either positive or negative IAPS images (see Hofmann, De Houwer, 
Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997). Then, 
participants sorted these novel symbols into categories. The results showed that 
participants in the positive-conditioning group created more categories relative to 
participants who were in the negative-conditioning group, demonstrating the traditional 
preference-categorization effect. Additionally, because the categorized symbols were 
initially affectively neutral, preference-categorization occurred independently from 
expertise, with pretest measures ruling out differences in memory, confidence, and 
mood. Another interesting finding was that participants used category labels that were 
mostly evaluative terms (i.e., 87% used valence adjectives like inspiring or ominous 
instead of categories based on symbol characteristics), which prompted the extension of 
the preference-categorization effect from traditional categorization to evaluative 
categorization (e.g., when we express opinions or attitudes using likert-type scales). 
 Studies looking at the preference-categorization effect for evaluative scales show 
that people prefer more evaluative scale points when rating objects within a liked versus 
disliked category (Smallman et al., 2014). For example, researchers gave participants a 
list of categories (e.g., movies, music, and food) and asked them to think only about 
items within each category they liked or disliked. When thinking about items they liked, 
participants created more rating scale labels (e.g., “Neutral”, “Okay”, “Good”, “Great”, 
and “Best”) than participants asked to think about items in those same categories that 
they disliked (e.g., “Bad” and “Worst”; Smallman et al., 2014). Additionally, to 
eliminate vocabulary knowledge as a potential confound, a follow-up study was 
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conducted using pre-constructed rating scales composed from the most common 
responses to the open-ended Study 1a responses. This study showed that people 
preferred pre-constructed rating scales with more evaluative points for liked (vs. 
disliked) objects.  
Further investigation showed that people also differ in their perception of scales 
constructed in this manner (i.e., more nuanced scales for liked versus disliked objects). 
When given a more differentiated (5-point) and a less differentiated (3-point) rating 
scale, participants found the more differentiated (vs. less differentiated) rating scale to be 
more efficacious for evaluating liked items (Smallman et al., 2014). That is, for liked 
objects, they found the more nuanced rating scale better in terms of how useful the scale 
was, how easy the scales would be to use, how well someone else could understand the 
participant’s ratings, and how well the participant could understand someone else’s 
ratings. This effect was not evident in the dislike condition.  Upon further investigation, 
participants also appeared to differ in their mental representations of liked and disliked 
objects (Smallman et al., 2014). Participants estimated how many items exist within each 
evaluative category on a six point evaluative scale. For example, participants would 
think of a food group they liked (e.g., American food) and estimate what percentage of 
American food items deserve a “Neutral” rating, what percentage of American food 
items deserve an “Okay” rating, etc. People in the like condition distributed the 
proportions across 4 of the 6 scale points. However, people in the dislike condition only 
distributed the proportion across 2 of the 6 scale points. This further demonstrates that 
people make more nuanced distinctions for liked (vs. disliked) objects, and may suggest 
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that the way people use rating scales may reflect these biases. Thus, these findings also 
may have implications for behavioral intentions and behavior. 
One of the functions of evaluative rating scales is to confer information about 
behavioral intentions (e.g., “Would I purchase this product again”, “Would I watch this 
movie again”, or “Would I eat here again”). Thus, if people make more nuanced 
distinctions for liked (vs. disliked) objects, we should see a similar effect for behavioral 
intentions. Smallman and Becker (in prep) found that people do make more nuanced 
distinctions between behavioral intentions for liked (vs. disliked) rating scale points. For 
example, when asked how likely they would be to visit a restaurant receiving different 
star ratings, participants in the liked (vs. disliked) cuisine condition made finer 
distinctions in behavioral intentions between restaurants with different scale ratings 
when the scale was more differentiated (i.e., 5-point). However, when the rating scale 
was less differentiated (i.e., 3-point) there were no differences between like and dislike 
conditions. This suggests that a more differentiated evaluative scale for disliked objects 
does not increase predictability of behavioral intentions. However, for liked objects, 
having more differentiation may predict differing degrees of intentions. Additionally, 
when looking at the effect of scale differentiation on behavior, studies show that 
participants who select more differentiated rating scales engage more with the target 
stimuli (Smallman & Becker, in prep). However, this effect only occurs for liked objects.  
1.2 Out-group Homogeneity and Cross-Race Effect  
 Currently, the preference-categorization effect has only examined consumer 
products (e.g., music, food, and movies). However, there are clear implications for how 
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individuals use rating scales to evaluate other people. The Out-group Homogeneity 
Effect (OHE) states that people make more nuanced distinctions for in-group (vs. out-
group) members, and that perceptions of out-group homogeneity typically stem from 
group stereotypes (Linville & Jones, 1980; Park & Judd, 1990; Quattrone & Jones, 
1980). These findings have been replicated across a variety of groups, such as gender 
(Hewstone, Crisp, & Turner, 2011), organizations (Jones et al., 1981; Park & Rothbart, 
1982), political affiliation (Kelly, 1989), and status (Lorenzi-Cioldi, 2008), using a 
variety of domains such as beliefs (Park & Rothbart, 1982), traits (Jones et al., 1981), 
and appearance (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). For example, a study examined different 
university organizations and asked members to estimate the variability of traits for 
different group members. Participants reported less variability for out-group member 
traits than for their in-group (Jones et al., 1981). Other studies have shown similar results 
when in-group and out-group was determined by age, gender, nationality, and classmates 
(Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989; Park & Judd, 1990). These findings are 
conceptually similar to research on the preference-categorization effect, except the target 
stimuli are in-groups and out-groups instead of liked and disliked objects. However, 
given that research has shown that out-group members are more disliked than in-group 
members (Brewer, 1979; Nesdale & Flesser, 2001), the findings may have similar 
mechanisms.  
A phenomenon similar to the OHE is the cross-race effect (CRE) or other-race 
effect which shows that people tend to recognize in-group faces with better accuracy 
than out-group faces (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). That is, people have a hard time 
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distinguishing between and remembering different out-group faces. In fact, simply 
classifying faces as in-group or out-group using a minimal groups paradigm is enough to 
elicit this effect (Bernstein, Young, & Hugenberg, 2007). One theory for why this occurs 
is that when people process out-group faces they focus on inclusive categorization 
(Bodenhausen, Macrae, & Hugenberg, 2003). However, when processing in-group faces, 
people focus on individuation (Hugenberg, Young, Bernstein, & Sacco, 2010; Sporer, 
2001). This social-cognitive theory of categorization may also explain the preference-
categorization effect. Just as people seem to individuate in-group faces, they also create 
a more nuanced conceptualization of preferred objects. Conversely, people seem to view 
out-group members and disliked objects as “all the same”, broadly categorizing them 
together. Also, research showing that people distribute the proportions of items across 
scale points differently for liked (vs. disliked) categories resembles OHE research 
showing that people estimate different variability for in-group (vs. out-group) members 
on traits and behaviors (Jones et al., 1981; Park & Judd; 1990; Smallman et al., 2014).  
For example, Park and Judd (1990) asked participants to estimate between which two 
endpoints on a likert-type rating scale 100% of group members would lie. They found 
that variability was higher when subjects were estimating endpoints for in-group (vs. 
out-group) members. Together, this research suggests that elaboration may be an 
underlying mechanism driving both the preference-categorization and out-group 
homogeneity effect. 
Additionally, motivation has been shown to influence both the preference-
categorization effect and the OHE, in that motivation (either intrinsic or extrinsic) can 
  11 
push people to make more nuanced distinctions where they normally would not. As 
discussed previously for the preference-categorization effect, people who are 
intrinsically motivated to engage in elaborative thought (i.e., high NFC) do not show the 
preference-categorization effect. However, those who are not intrinsically motivated to 
engage in this type of processing (i.e., low NFC) do prefer more scale-points for liked 
(vs. disliked) objects (Smallman et al., 2014). For low NFC individuals, motivation 
comes externally from the pleasure one derives from engaging with their preferences. 
Thus, extrinsic motivation from preferences leads to more nuanced distinctions while 
intrinsic motivation to think in an elaborative manner eliminates this difference in 
perceived nuance. Similarly, Hugenberg, Miller, and Claypool (2007) found evidence 
that motivation may be one possible mechanism driving the CRE. When they induced a 
high motivational state, by informing participants before completing a face recall task 
that they might show racial bias, there was no evidence of the CRE. That is, participants 
showed more discerning evaluations of individuating features when they were in a 
motivated state. 
Prior research on the OHE and CRE suggests that we should be able to apply the 
preference-categorization effect to ratings of individuals. People make more nuanced 
distinctions when evaluating in-group members and see them as displaying more 
variability in terms of appearance, traits, and beliefs. In contrast, people make fewer 
nuanced distinctions when evaluating out-group members. Although the focus of prior 
evaluative categorization research has been on liked and disliked consumer items, people 
tend to like in-group members and derogate out-group members. Prior OHE findings 
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suggest that scale selection for liked individuals and in-group members should resemble 
‘liked items’. Conversely, scale selection for disliked individuals and out-group 
members should resemble ‘disliked items’. Therefore, I predict that the preference-
categorization effect should apply to how individuals prefer to rate others who are liked 
(vs. disliked) and members of in (vs. out) groups. Additionally, the preference-
categorization effect and OHE may both stem from elaboration of nuanced details for 
preferred objects and in-group members. As people elaborate on the nuances of preferred 
objects, they may begin to perceive small differences as stark contrasts. Similarly, the 
tendency to individuate in-group members while broadly categorizing out-group 
members may lead to less perceived variability in out-group members. If the preference-
categorization effect stems from similar processes as the OHE, then the two measures 
should be correlated. 
1.3 Current Studies 
 The current studies assessed the preference-categorization effect in the context of 
person evaluations. Prior research has only examined scale preferences for liked and 
disliked objects, so the current studies focused on scale preferences when rating liked/in-
group members versus disliked/out-group members. Experiment 1 examined the 
preference-categorization effect in ratings of liked (vs. disliked) others. Participants 
focused on people they liked (vs. disliked) and created their own rating scales for each 
group. Experiments 2a, 2b, and 2c used a similar design, except participants evaluated 
in-group (vs. out-group) members. Additionally, participants selected from pre-
constructed rating scales to eliminate a possible confound of vocabulary knowledge for 
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positive (vs. negative) evaluative terms. Furthermore, the groups used in Experiments 
2a, 2b, and 2c varied in terms of affiliation length, allowing me to examine whether the 
amount of time the participant has been affiliated with the in-group affects the 
preference-categorization effect. These studies also included exploratory measures of 
affect, group-level emotions, and need for cognition. Finally, Experiment 3 included an 
OHE measure to determine whether perceived variability was related to the preference-
categorization effect. Findings from the OHE and preference-categorization suggest that, 
across all studies, participants should prefer more evaluative scale points when rating 
individuals from a liked/in-group (vs. disliked/out-group).  
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2. EXPERIMENT 1 
Experiment 1 applies the preference-categorization effect to interpersonal ratings 
by asking participants how many scale points they would need to rate either liked or 
disliked others. Preference was manipulated on a between-subject basis by asking 
participants to think about one of two categories: people that they like or people that they 
dislike (generally, as a category, not specific individuals). The dependent variable was 
how many distinct scale points participants wanted in order to evaluate these groups.  
2.1 Methods 
2.1.1 Participants. Undergraduate students (N = 282; Age M = 19.07, SD = 1.02; 
64.4% female) participated for course credit. Sample size for this study was based on a 
target minimum of 100 per cell. However, because of the complicated nature of the 
instructions, we aimed to run an additional 50 participants to account for participant 
attrition. Given that lab sessions are scheduled on a weekly basis, data collection was 
terminated at the end of the week in which this minimum was exceeded. Forty-five 
people were excluded from the analyses for not following directions (i.e., including both 
positive and negative scale items (N = 42), naming specific people (N = 2), or not 
providing any scale labels (N = 1). A power analysis (G_power 3.1) showed that a 
sample size of 237 provides 100% statistical power to detect a large effect size (d = 
0.80), 96.95% statistical power to detect a medium effect size (d = 0.50), and 33.50% 
statistical power to detect a small effect size (d = 0.20). In a between-subjects design, 
participants were randomly assigned to focus on the people they either like or dislike (as 
a category).  
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2.1.2 Preference-Categorization Task. First, participants received general 
instructions about the evaluation task, “People have to make decisions regarding others 
almost every day. For example, businesses and universities need to make decisions 
involving whom to hire or accept based on overall impressions. While there are several 
aspects one may like or dislike about others, at the end of the day, it is the overall 
evaluation that matters.”  Next, participants received the manipulation to focus only on 
people they generally like or dislike. That is, the types of people they normally feel 
neutral to extremely positively (negatively) about and imagine that they were going to 
evaluate only those individuals. They were told to think about rating people they like 
(dislike) in general and not specific individuals. This was done to ensure that differences 
in rating scales were due to perceptions of liked and disliked individuals and not salient 
characteristics of specific individuals. Finally, they indicated how many different scale 
points they would need to make useful evaluations if someone wanted to know how 
good (bad) these people are. Participants first wrote the number of rating-scale points 
they would need to evaluate those individuals and subsequently provided the label 
names for each rating point. 
2.2 Results 
 An ANOVA was conducted to examine the hypotheses that people prefer more 
scale points for liked (vs. disliked) people. As hypothesized, people preferred more scale 
points when evaluating liked (M = 4.90, SD = 3.05) versus disliked (M = 4.21, SD = 
1.93) people; F(1, 234) = 3.85, p = .051, np
2 = .02, 95% CI [-1.33, -0.04], See Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Amount of evaluative information (in the form of evaluative rating scales) 
sought out as a function of condition in Experiment 1. 
 
2.3 Discussion 
 Results of Experiment 1 provide initial evidence that the preference-
categorization effect applies to ratings of people. That is, people prefer more rating 
scale-points when thinking about rating liked (vs. disliked) others. However, one 
alternative explanation may be that people have a richer vocabulary for or easier access 
to relevant scale labels for liked (vs. disliked) others. An additional concern is the 
number of participants who had to be excluded because they created positive and 
negative scale points.  
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3. EXPERIMENTS 2A, 2B, AND 2C 
Experiments 2a (religious affiliation), 2b (university affiliation ), and 2c 
(political affiliation) extended the findings from Experiment 1 by examining how many 
rating scale points participants prefer when evaluating in-group versus out-group 
members. Just as people prefer more evaluative scale points to rate objects and people 
they like (vs. dislike), participants should prefer more evaluative scale points when 
rating in-group (vs. out-group) members in part because people tend to show greater 
liking for in-group members and derogation of out-group members (Brewer, 1979; 
Nesdale & Flesser, 2001). These experiments used pre-constructed rating scales (created 
from the most typical responses given in Experiment 1; see Appendix). In Experiment 1, 
it may have simply been easier for participants to think of relevant scale labels for liked 
(vs. disliked) others, or they may simply have a richer vocabulary for these terms. 
Therefore, Experiments 2a, 2b, and 2c used pre-constructed rating scales in order to rule 
out the effects of vocabulary knowledge. One additional reason for using pre-constructed 
rating scales was because of the large number of people who did not follow directions in 
Experiment 1 (i.e., created positive and negative scale labels).  
Additionally, all three studies used pre-exiting groups (i.e., group membership 
was not manipulated) that differed in how long participants had been affiliated with each 
group. In a longitudinal study, Ryan and Bogart (1997) tested the OHE in sororities 
throughout a 6 month interval. Although initially sorority members showed an in-group 
homogeneity effect; the OHE emerged as time progressed. Therefore, time identifying 
with in-group members may also affect the preference-categorization effect in the 
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current studies. Most participants will have been raised with their current religious 
beliefs (Experiment 2a). However, freshmen will have only identified with their 
university for a few months (Experiment 2b), and most people may have only come into 
their political ideologies in their late-teens when they were old enough to understand 
them and vote (Experiment 2c). If the preference-categorization effect occurs because 
liking leads to repeated exposure and repeated exposure increases liking, then differing 
duration of group membership might affect how long people have had the opportunity to 
elaborate on group differences. However, prior preference-categorization research 
suggests that this may not occur. Smallman and Roese (2008) showed that the 
preference-categorization effect can occur independently of expertise. Therefore, people 
may still show the effect when they have only belonged to a group for a short time. 
Participants also completed exploratory measures to determine whether affect, emotion, 
or NFC influences the preference-categorization effect.  
3.1 Methods 
3.1.1 Participants. Participants were either undergraduate students or were 
recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (Experiment 2a students: N = 165, Age M = 
18.42, SD = 0.78; 78.8% female; Experiment 2b students: N = 137, Age M = 18.62, SD = 
0.78; 77.4% female; Experiment 2c Mturk: N = 204, Age M = 35.86, SD = 12.34; 52.0% 
female). Undergraduate students participated for course credit, and Mturk participants 
received $0.20 for their participation. In a between-subjects design, participants were 
randomly assigned to an in-group or out-group condition. Sample size for this study was 
based on a target minimum of 50 per cell. For undergraduate studies, given that lab 
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sessions are scheduled on a weekly basis, data collection was terminated at the end of 
the week in which this minimum was exceeded. For Mturk participants, we recruited 
additional participants to account for attrition. A power analysis (G_power 3.1) showed 
that: 2a) a sample size of 165 provides 100% statistical power to detect a large effect 
size (d = 1.18), 99.57% statistical power to detect a medium effect size (d = 0.78), and 
34.44% statistical power to detect a small effect size (d = 0.28); 2b) a sample size of 137 
provides 100% statistical power to detect a large effect size (d = 1.18), 98.56% statistical 
power to detect a medium effect size (d = 0.78), and 29.08% statistical power to detect a 
small effect size (d = 0.28); and 2c) a sample size of 204 provides 100% statistical power 
to detect a large effect size (d = 1.18), 99.93% statistical power to detect a medium effect 
size (d = 0.78), and 41.72% statistical power to detect a small effect size (d = 0.28). 
Effect size calculations were based on multiple regressions models with two predictors. 
Prescreen questions were used to recruit people with specific group memberships 
prior to the studies. In Experiment 2a, only students strongly identifying as Christian 
were recruited to participate. Prescreen measures asked participants to identify their 
current religious affiliation and how strongly they identify with that religion ([1] Not At 
All to [5] Very Strongly). Only participants who identified as Christian and selected 4 or 
5 on the identity strength question were allowed to participate. They evaluated either 
Christians (in-group) or Muslims (out-group). In Experiment 2b, participants evaluated 
students from Texas A&M (in-group) or the University of Alabama (out-group). Finally, 
similar restrictions to 2a were used for experiment 2c, which concerned Republicans and 
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Democrats. Participants in the in-group condition evaluated members of their own party, 
while participants in the out-group condition evaluated members of the other party.  
3.1.2 Preference-Categorization Task. Participants were told that they would 
be evaluating a group and to imagine, generally, what these people might be like. They 
were instructed to not focus on any one person specifically but imagine this group as a 
whole. They selected the rating scale, from 2 to 7 scale points, they would prefer to use 
when rating either in-group or out-group members in general depending on condition 
(see Appendix for scale labels).  
3.1.3 Group Identification. In all three studies, participants answered group 
identity questions for both the in-group and out-group [2a: Christians (α = .92) and 
Muslims (α = .48), 2b: Texas A&M University (α = .93) and University of Alabama (α = 
.84), 2c: Republicans and Democrats (in-group α = .94, out-group α = .96)]. Group 
identity was assessed using a four-item measure (adapted from Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 
2007). Additionally, participants completed one rating of Other in the Self (IOS; Aron, 
Aron, & Smollan, 1992), which asked participants to select the picture that best 
described their affiliation with the in-group/out-group. Pictures were Venn diagrams 
with one circle labeled “Self” and the other circle labeled “Group” Each of the 7 images 
showed the circles with progressively more overlap. Finally, participants indicated how 
long they have identified with their current (religious, university, political) group.  
3.1.4 Group Attitudes and Emotions. In all three studies, attitude was measured 
using a sliding scale (range 0 [Very cold or unfavorable feelings]-100 [Very warm or 
favorable feelings]). In Experiment 2a and 2b, participants also answered a series of 
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exploratory questions about their emotions towards in-group and out-group members. 
Participants answered to what extent they felt each emotion when thinking about in-
group and out-group members. Emotions included angry, disgusted, afraid, happy, 
proud, delighted, sad, uneasy, bored, at ease, hopeful, and respectful.  
3.1.5 Need for Cognition. Experiment 2a included the 18-item NFC scale 
(Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) as an exploratory measure. Sample items include “I 
would prefer complex to simple problems” and “The idea of relying on thought to make 
my way to the top appeals to me” (α = .86).  
3.1.6 Demographics and Debriefing. Finally, participants completed debriefing 
and demographic questions. These questions included whether participants recalled what 
group they were evaluating and what suspicions they had regarding the study.  
3.2 Results  
 3.2.1 Results for Experiment 2a. Experiment 2a included undergraduate 
students who strongly identified as Christian. They evaluated either Christians (in-group) 
or Muslims (out-group) depending on condition. This study contained measures of 
preference-categorization, group identity, IOS, and time affiliated with in-group. I also 
included exploratory measures of attitude toward in-group and out-group members, 
group level emotions for in-group and out-group members, and NFC. 
3.2.1.1 Preference-Categorization 2a. The results of an ANOVA with condition 
(in-group vs. out-group) as the predictor variable and preferred number of scale points as 
the outcome variable supported my hypothesis that participant prefer more evaluative 
scale points when rating in-group members versus out-group members (M = 5.51, SD = 
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1.39 vs. M = 4.44, SD = 1.58; F(1,163) = 21.48, p < .001, np
2 = .12, 95% CI [0.62, 1.54], 
See Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Amount of evaluative information (in the form of evaluative rating scales) 
sought out as a function of condition in Experiment 2a. 
 
3.2.1.2 Group Identification 2a. The four group identification measures were 
averaged to form an overall group identification index for both participant’s in-group (α 
= .92) and out-group (α = .48). A Repeated-Measures ANOVA revealed that group 
identification was stronger for the in-group than the out-group (M = 6.59, SD = 0.91 vs. 
M = 1.18, SD = 0.41, F(1, 164) = 4508.03, p < .001, np
2 = .97, 95% CI [5.25, 5.57]). To 
examine whether identification with one’s in-group or out-group influenced the effect of 
condition on scale selection, I conduced a regression analysis recommended by Cohen 
and Cohen (1983). Condition (0 = out-group, 1 = in-group) and mean centered group 
identification were entered in the first step to examine the individual effect of each 
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variable on scale selection. I tested the interactive effect by entering the Condition X 
mean centered Identification interaction term in the second step (Aiken & West, 1991). I 
ran the analysis once using in-group attitude and once using out-group attitude. For both 
models, there was a significant main effect of condition (model containing in-group 
identification: b = -1.09, t(161) = -4.64, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.55, -0.62]; model 
containing out-group identification: b = -1.09, t(161) = -4.65, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.57, -
0.63]). However, there were no main effects of in-group or out-group identity nor any 
significant interaction effects. 
3.2.1.3 IOS Measures 2a. Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS; Aron et al., 1992) 
was measured using a Venn diagram with progressively overlapping circles labeled self 
and group (1 = no overlap to 7 = significant overlap). A repeated-measures ANOVA 
showed that people feel closer to their in-group versus their out-group (M = 6.08, SD = 
1.17 vs. M = 1.39, SD = 0.79, F(1, 164) = 1908.22, p < .001, np
2 = .92, 95% CI [4.49, 
4.91]). To examine whether perceived closeness to one’s in-group or out-group 
influenced the effect of condition on scale selection, I conduced a regression analysis 
recommended by Cohen and Cohen (1983). Condition (0 = out-group, 1 = in-group) and 
mean centered IOS were entered in the first step to examine the individual effect of each 
variable on scale selection. I tested the interactive effect by entering the Condition X 
mean centered IOS interaction term in the second step (Aiken & West, 1991). I ran the 
analysis once using in-group IOS and once using out-group IOS. For both models, there 
was a significant main effect of condition (model containing in-group IOS: b = -1.08, 
t(161) = -4.62, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.54, -0.62]; model containing out-group IOS: b = -
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1.02, t(161) = -4.40, p < .001, 95% CI [-1.48, -0.56]). However, there were no main 
effects of in-group or out-group IOS or any significant interaction effects. 
3.2.1.4 Time Measure 2a. To test the hypothesis that condition and time 
identifying with in-group members affects scale selection, I ran a regression with 
condition and time entered in the first step, and the condition by time interaction term in 
the second step. The outcome variable was how many scale points participants preferred. 
Results showed a significant main effect of time (b = .01, t(161) = 2.61, p = .010, 95% 
CI [0.00, 0.03]), but there was not a significant main effect of condition.   However, we 
found a significant Condition X Time interaction (b = -.01, t(161) = -2.69, p = .008, 95% 
CI [-0.02, -0.00]; See Figure 3). Simple slopes analysis showed that the longer a 
participant had been affiliated with their current in-group the fewer scale points they 
preferred when rating out-group members (b = -0.004, t(161) = -2.74, p = .007). 
Additionally, the longer a participant had been affiliated with their current in-group the 
more scale points they preferred for evaluations of in-group members (b = 0.005, t(161) 
= 2.33, p = .021). To determine at what time points people prefer more scale-points for 
in-group (vs. out-group) members I used the Johnson-Neyman (1936) technique through 
PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) to determine the range of significance for the moderator. This 
allowed us to determine at what levels of the moderator (time in months affiliated with 
the in-group) the two conditions (in-group vs. out-group) were significantly different. 
This was used instead of the pick-a-point approach, as we did not identify any 
nonarbitrary points to probe (see Hayes & Matthes, 2009). Results showed that people 
preferred more evaluative scale-points for in-group (vs. out-group) members when they 
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had identified with the in-group for 114.59 months (about 9.5 years, b = 0.57, 95%CI [-
1.14, 0.00], t = -1.97, p = .05. About 62% of our sample had been affiliated with their in-
group for more than 144 months (Min = 2 months, Max = 456 months).  
 
 
Figure 3. Amount of evaluative information (in the form of evaluative rating scales) 
sought out as a function of condition and time affiliated with the in-group in Experiment 
2a.  
 
3.2.1.5 Attitude Measure 2a. Attitude was measured using a sliding scale (range 
0 [Very cold or unfavorable feelings]-100 [Very warm or favorable feelings]). A 
repeated-measures ANOVA revealed that attitude was more positive for in-group (vs. 
out-group) members (M = 94.01, SD = 9.95 vs. M = 60.07, SD = 22.13; F(1,164) = 
317.35, p < .001, np
2 = .66, 95% CI [30.17, 37.69]). To examine whether attitude toward 
one’s in-group or out-group influenced the effect of condition on scale selection, I 
conducted a regression analysis recommended by Cohen and Cohen (1983). Condition 
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(0 = out-group, 1 = in-group) and mean centered attitude were entered in the first step to 
examine the individual effect of each variable on scale selection. I tested the interactive 
effect by entering the Condition X mean centered Attitude interaction term in the second 
step (Aiken & West, 1991). I ran the analysis once using in-group attitude and once 
using out-group attitude. For both models, there was a significant main effect of 
condition (model containing in-group attitude: b = -1.05, t(161) = -4.47, p < .001, 95% 
CI [-1.51, -0.59]; model containing out-group attitude: b = -1.09, t(161) = -4.64, p < 
.001, 95% CI [-1.55, -0.63]). However, there were no main effects of in-group or out-
group attitude or any significant interaction effects. 
3.2.1.6 Emotion Measures 2a. Across all emotion measures, participants 
endorsed stronger positive emotions (happy, proud, delight, at ease, hope, and respect) 
for in-group members and stronger negative emotions (anger, sad, disgusted, afraid, 
uneasy, and bored) for out-group members (all F’s > 19.48, all p’s <.001). From these 12 
items, I created four emotion indexes (high intensity positive, high intensity negative, 
low intensity positive, and low intensity negative). High intensity positive emotions 
included happiness, pride, and delight. High intensity negative emotions included anger, 
disgust, and fear. Low intensity positive emotions included ease, hope, and respect. Low 
intensity negative emotions included sadness, unease, and boredom.  Previous research 
suggests that high intensity emotions lead to narrowing of attention and low intensity 
emotions lead to broadening of attention regardless of valence (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 
2008; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010a; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010b; Harmon-Jones, 
Gable, & Price, 2013; Price & Harmon-Jones, 2010). If high intensity emotions lead to 
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narrowing of attention, this may lead to increased perception of nuances and preference 
for more evaluative scale points, whereas low intensity emotions and broadening of 
attention may lead to decreased perception of nuances and preference for fewer 
evaluative scale points. To examine the effect of emotions on scale selection, I ran a 
bivariate correlation analysis including the four emotion indexes (both in-group and out-
group evaluations) and number of scale points selected. There were no significant 
correlations between these emotion indexes and scale selection (all p > .08). 
3.2.1.7 Need for Cognition 2a. The 18-items measuring Need for Cognition 
(NFC; Cacioppo et al., 1984) were averaged to form an overall NFC index (α = .86). To 
examine whether NFC influenced the effect of condition on scale selection, I conducted 
a regression analysis recommended by Cohen and Cohen (1983). Condition (0 = out-
group, 1 = in-group) and mean centered NFC were entered in the first step to examine 
the individual effect of each variable on scale selection. I tested the interactive effect by 
entering the Condition X mean centered NFC interaction term in the second step (Aiken 
& West, 1991). There was a significant main effect of condition (b = -1.10, t(161) = -
4.50, p <.001), 95% CI [-1.58, -0.62]. However, there was no main effect of NFC or a 
significant interaction.  
 3.2.2 Results for Experiment 2b. Experiment 2b included undergraduate 
students from Texas A&M. They evaluated either Texas A&M University (in-group) or 
University of Alabama (out-group) students depending on condition. This study 
contained measures of preference-categorization, group identity, IOS, and time affiliated 
with in-group. I also included exploratory measures of attitude toward in-group and out-
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group members and group level emotions for in-group and out-group members. NFC 
was not collected because we found no evidence that it affected preference-
categorization in Experiment 2a. 
3.2.2.1 Preference-Categorization 2b. The results of an ANOVA with condition 
(in-group vs. out-group) as the predictor variable and preferred number of scale points as 
the outcome variable support my hypothesis that participants prefer more evaluative 
scale points when rating in-group members versus out-group members (M = 5.08, SD = 
1.28 vs. M = 4.59, SD = 1.49; F(1,135) = 4.14, p = .044, np
2 = .03, 95% CI [0.01, 0.96], 
See Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. Amount of evaluative information (in the form of evaluative rating scales) 
sought out as a function of condition in Experiment 2b. 
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= .93) and out-group (α = .84). A Repeated-Measures ANOVA revealed that group 
identity was stronger for the in-group than the out-group (M = 6.38, SD = 1.03 vs. M = 
1.33, SD = 0.71, F(1,136) = 2004.57, p < .001, np
2 = .94, 95% CI [4.83, 5.27]). To 
examine whether identification with one’s in-group or out-group influenced the effect of 
condition on scale selection, I conducted the same analyses used in Experiment 2a. For 
both models, there was a significant main effect of condition (model containing in-group 
identification: b = -0.50, t(133) = -2.08, p = .040, 95% CI [-0.97, -0.02]; model 
containing out-group identification: b = -0.51, t(133) = -2.16, p = .032, 95% CI [-0.98, -
0.04]). However, there were no main effects of in-group or out-group identity or any 
significant interaction effects. 
3.2.2.3 IOS Measures 2b. IOS was measured using a Venn diagram with 
progressively overlapping circles labeled self and group (1 = no overlap to 7 = 
significant overlap). A repeated-measures ANOVA showed that people feel closer to 
their in-group versus their out-group (M = 5.51, SD = 1.48 vs. M = 1.32, SD = 0.89, F(1, 
136) = 776.77, p < .001, np
2 = .85, 95% CI [3.89, 4.49]). To examine whether perceived 
closeness to one’s in-group or out-group influenced the effect of condition on scale 
selection, I conduced the same analysis used in Experiment 2a. For both models, there 
was a significant main effect of condition (model containing in-group IOS: b = -0.48, 
t(133) = -2.02, p = .045, 95% CI [-0.96, -0.01]; model containing out-group IOS: b = -
0.59, t(133) = -2.48, p = .015, 95% CI [-1.07, -0.12]). However, there were no main 
effects of in-group or out-group IOS or any significant interaction effect. 
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3.2.2.4 Time Measure 2b. To test the hypothesis that condition and time 
identifying with in-group members affects scale selection, I ran a regression with 
condition and time entered in the first step, and the Condition X Time interaction term in 
the second step. The outcome variable was how many scale points participants preferred. 
Results showed no significant main effects or an interaction effect. 
3.2.2.5 Attitude Measure 2b. Attitude was measured using a sliding scale (range 
0 [Very cold or unfavorable feelings]-100 [Very warm or favorable feelings]). A 
repeated-measures ANOVA revealed that attitude was more positive for in-group (vs. 
out-group) members (M = 92.78, SD = 10.57 vs. M = 38.22, SD = 21.87; F(1,136) = 
581.67, p < .001, np
2 = .81, 95% CI [50.09, 59.04]). To examine whether attitude toward 
one’s in-group or out-group influenced the effect of condition on scale selection, I 
conduced the same analysis used in Experiment 2a. For both models, there was a 
significant main effect of condition (model containing in-group attitude: b = -0.51, 
t(133) = -2.14, p = .034, 95% CI [-0.97, -0.04]; model containing out-group attitude: b = 
-0.47, t(133) = -2.00, p = .048, 95% CI [-0.94, -0.01]). However, there were no main 
effects of in-group or out-group attitude or any significant interaction effects. 
3.2.2.6 Emotion Measures 2b. Across all emotion measures, participants 
endorsed stronger positive emotions (happy, proud, delight, at ease, hope, and respect) 
for in-group members and stronger negative emotions (anger, sad, disgusted, afraid, 
uneasy, and bored) for out-group members (all F’s > 7.76, all p’s <.01). To examine the 
effect of emotions on scale selection, I ran a bivariate correlation analysis including the 
four emotion indexes (high intensity positive, high intensity negative, low intensity 
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positive, and low intensity negative) for both in-group and out-group evaluations and 
number of scale points selected. Across conditions (in-group and out-group scale 
selection), the index for low-intensity, positive emotions toward in-group members was 
correlated with preference for more scale points (r = .18, p = .034). Additionally, the 
index for high-intensity, positive emotions toward in-group members was moderately 
correlated with preference for more scale points (r = .17, p = .054). However, when 
looking at low and high intensity, positive emotions by condition, the correlations 
become non-significant for in-group scale selection (r = .14, p = .273 and r = .15, p = 
.230 respectively). These correlations also become non-significant for out-group scale 
selection (r = .21, p = .073 and r = .16, p = .187 respectively). For in-group scale 
selection, we predicted that more positive feelings about the in-group would lead to a 
preference for more differentiated evaluative scales. However, the correlations are 
stronger for in-group positive emotions leading to a preference for more differentiated 
evaluative scales for the out-group. We would have expected a negative correlation here 
as more positive emotions about the in-group should have led to more derogation of the 
out-group and less nuanced evaluative scales.  Therefore, these relationships do not 
support the proposed hypotheses or results found in Experiment 2a. There were no other 
significant correlations between in or out-group emotions and scale selection (all p > 
.146) 
 3.2.3 Results for Experiment 2c. Experiment 2c included individuals recruited 
using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk who strongly identified as Republican or Democrat. 
They evaluated either members of the same party (in-group) or the opposite party (out-
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group) depending on condition. This study contained measures of preference-
categorization, group identity, IOS, and time affiliated with in-group. I also included 
exploratory measures of attitude toward in-group and out-group members. However, this 
study did not include exploratory measures for group level emotions for in-group and 
out-group members, and NFC because we found no evidence that they affected 
preference-categorization in Experiment 2a or 2b. 
3.2.3.1 Preference-Categorization 2c. The results of an ANOVA with condition 
(in-group vs. out-group) as the predictor variable and preferred number of scale points as 
the outcome variable support my hypothesis that participant prefer more evaluative scale 
points when rating in-group members versus out-group members (M = 5.24, SD = 1.39 
vs. M = 4.70, SD = 1.55; F(1,202) = 6.87, p = .009, np
2 = .03, 95% CI [-0.95, -0.13], See 
Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Amount of evaluative information (in the form of evaluative rating scales) 
sought out as a function of condition in Experiment 2c. 
 
 3.2.3.2 Group Identification 2c. The four group identification measures were 
averaged to form an overall group identification index for both participant’s in-group (α 
= .99) and out-group (α = .99). A Repeated-Measures ANOVA revealed that group 
identity was stronger for the in-group than the out-group (M = 5.78, SD = 1.18 vs. M = 
1.55, SD = 1.12, F(1, 203) = 1065.20, p < .001, np
2 = .84, 95% CI [3.98, 4.49]). To 
examine whether identification with one’s in-group or out-group influenced the effect of 
condition on scale selection, I conduced the same analyses used in Experiment 2a and 
2b. For both models, there was a significant main effect of condition (model containing 
in-group identification: b = 0.51, t(200) = 2.50, p = .013, 95% CI [0.11, 0.91]; model 
containing out-group identification: b = 0.52, t(200) = 2.51, p = .013, 95% CI [0.11, 
0.93]). There was no significant main effect of in-group or out-group identity. However, 
there was a significant interaction effect of condition and in-group identity, b = 0.36, 
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t(200) = 2.04, p = .042, 95% CI [0.01, 0.70], See Figure 6. Simple slopes analysis 
showed that stronger group identity for in-group members increased the number of scale 
points they preferred when rating in-group members (b = 0.320, t(200) = 2.58, p = .011). 
However, this relationship was not significant for evaluations of out-group members (b = 
-0.035, t(200) = -0.29, p = .774). There was no interaction effect of condition and out-
group identity.  
 
 
Figure 6. Amount of evaluative information (in the form of evaluative rating scales) 
sought out as a function of condition and in-group identification in Experiment 2c.  
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closeness to one’s in-group or out-group influenced the effect of condition on scale 
selection, I conduced the same analysis used in Experiment 2a and 2b. For both models, 
there was a significant main effect of condition (model containing in-group IOS: b = 
0.53, t(200) = 2.54, p = .012, 95% CI [0.12, 0.94]; model containing out-group IOS: b = 
0.51, t(200) = 2.43, p = .016, 95% CI [0.10, 0.92]). However, there were no main effect 
of in-group or out-group IOS or any significant interaction effects. 
3.2.3.4 Time Measure 2c. To test the hypothesis that condition and time 
identifying with in-group members affects scale selection, I ran a regression with 
condition and time entered in the first step, and the Condition X Time interaction term in 
the second step. The outcome variable was how many scale points participants preferred. 
Results showed no significant main effects or an interaction effect. 
3.2.3.5 Attitude Measure 2c. Attitude was measured using a sliding scale (range 
0 [Very cold or unfavorable feelings]-100 [Very warm or favorable feelings]). A 
repeated-measures ANOVA revealed that attitude was more positive for in-group (vs. 
out-group) members (M = 79.93, SD = 16.14 vs. M = 29.99, SD = 22.72; F(1,203) = 
523.16, p < .001, np
2 = .72, 95% CI [45.64, 54.25]). To examine whether attitude toward 
one’s in-group or out-group influenced the effect of condition on scale selection, I 
conduced the same analysis used in Experiment 2a and 2b. For both models, there was a 
significant main effect of condition (model containing in-group attitude: b = 0.47, t(200) 
= 2.29, p = .023, 95% CI [0.07, 0.87]; model containing out-group attitude: b = 0.49, 
t(200) = 2.34, p = .020, 95% CI [0.08, 0.90]). However, there were no main effects of in-
group or out-group attitude or any significant interaction effects. 
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3.3 Discussion 
 Across three studies, participants demonstrated the preference-categorization 
effect when evaluating people. Participants preferred more scale points when evaluating 
in-group (vs. outgroup) members, and this effect was consistent across three different 
group types (religion, university affiliation, and political party). Additionally, this effect 
replicated across different sample populations varying in age and demographics. 
Experiment 2a and 2b used university students, while Experiment 2c recruited people 
using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Furthermore, these studies extend these findings to 
in-group and out-group members. Prior studies have shown the preference-
categorization effect for liked (vs. disliked) objects and people. These results also extend 
findings from Experiment 1 by eliminating vocabulary knowledge of and accessibility to 
relevant category labels as a possible confounds. Moreover, using pre-constructed scales 
eliminated need to exclude participants for not following directions, and no participants 
were excluded from Experiments 2a, 2b, or 2c. 
There was evidence in Experiment 2a that time affiliated with one’s in-group 
moderated the effect of preference on scale-selection. As hypothesized, the longer a 
participant had been affiliated with their in-group, the fewer scale points they wanted to 
rate out-group members.  This may result from increased degradation of out-group 
members over time, which is consistent with OHE research. However, we did not find 
this effect in Experiment 2b or 2c.  
 Experiment 2c suggested that identification with the in-group may affect 
preference-categorization. In this study, I found that people prefer more scale points 
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when rating in-group (vs. outgroup) members. However, this was qualified by a 
significant interaction showing that stronger in-group identity increased preference for 
more scale points when evaluating in-group members, but stronger in-group identity did 
not affect scale selection for evaluating out-group members. However, this effect was 
not replicated in Experiment 2a or 2b. Additionally, there was no effect of perceived 
closeness (IOS) on preference categorization. 
One explanation may be that, overall, people tend to have greater liking for in-
group members (Brewer, 1979; Nesdale & Flesser, 2001) and liking may influence 
preference-categorization. I included exploratory measures of group level emotions and 
attitude to determine whether they influenced scale selection, specifically focusing on 
emotional intensity and valence. Though some significant correlations were found in 
Experiment 2b, they were not supported by findings from Experiment 2a. Additionally, 
they did not support our hypotheses. There was also no evidence that attitude toward in-
group or out-group members influenced the preference-categorization effect. Finally, no 
significant findings emerged from the exploratory measure of NFC.  
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4. EXPERIMENT 3 
Thus far, the current studies show that people prefer more evaluative scale-points 
when rating in-group (vs. out-group) members. One reason for this may be that people 
may make fewer nuanced distinctions between out-group (vs. in-group) members. This 
is consistent with OHE and CRE findings showing that people see out-group members as 
more homogeneous. If evaluative scale selection relates to perceived group variability, 
then we should see a positive relationship between OHE measures and the preference-
categorization effect.  
4.1 Methods 
4.1.1 Participants. Participants were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(N = 183, Age M = 39.03, SD = 13.45; 52.5% female). Participants received $0.20 for 
their participation. In a between-subjects design, participants were randomly assigned to 
an in-group or out-group condition. Sample size for this study was based on a target 
minimum of 50 per cell. However, we ran an additional 83 participants to account for 
participant attrition. A power analysis (G_power 3.1) showed that a sample size of 183 
provides 100% statistical power to detect a large effect size (d = 1.18), 99.81% statistical 
power to detect a medium effect size (d = 0.78), and 37.83% statistical power to detect a 
small effect size (d = 0.28) using a multiple regression model with two predictors. 
4.1.2 Measures. Experiment 3 used the same participant restrictions and 
measures as Experiment 2c. Only participants who indicated a strong or very strong 
identification with the Republican or Democratic Party were allowed to participate. They 
completed the preference-categorization task as well as group identity, IOS, time 
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measures, and attitude measures similar to those used in Experiment 2b. Additionally, 
participants completed an OHE measure adapted from prior OHE research (Park & 
Rothbart, 1982; Pickett & Brewer, 2001; Ryan & Judd, 1992; Ryan, Judd, & Park, 
1996). Participants indicated the percentage of people from both their in-group and out-
group they believed would endorse different group stereotypes.  
Stereotypes for our OHE measure were obtained prior to the current study using 
methods adapted from Park and Rothbart (1982). Pretest subjects (N = 55) were asked to 
list any behaviors or traits they considered typical of Republicans and Democrats. Then, 
the 30 most common responses (15 for Republicans and 15 for Democrats) were 
presented to a second set of participants (N = 55). Participants were asked what group 
would be more likely to endorse each item using a 7-point scale ([1] Strongly 
Republican, [2] Moderately Republican, [3] Slightly Republican [4] Equally Endorsed 
by Both, [5] Slightly Democrat, [6] Moderately Democrat, and [7] Strongly Democrat). 
Using criteria for inclusion from Park and Rothbart (1982), ratings were then collapsed 
into 3 categories: Republican (scale values 1, 2, 3), neutral (4), and Democrat (5, 6, 7). 
For the final item list, an item had to contain fewer than 50% of responses in the neutral 
category and the differences between the two polarized ratings had to be greater than 
25%. For example, the item “Pro-Choice” was categorized as a Republican value by 
15.5% of participants, equally Republican and Democrat by 2.2% of participants, and a 
Democratic value by 82.1% of participants. Because fewer than 50% of participants 
listed it as both and the difference between polarized ratings was greater than 25%, this 
item was used in Experiment 3.  
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The final measure of out-group homogeneity used 8 items identified during the 
pretest (4 Republican and 4 Democrat). Participants were asked, for each item, what 
percentage of group members would endorse each item (e.g., What percentage of 
Republicans are pro-life?). These estimates were used to create two indexes of perceived 
group variability (in-group and out-group). In-group variability was then subtracted from 
out-group variability to create an OHE score where higher scores indicate greater 
perceived out-group homogeneity. Finally, participants completed similar debriefing and 
demographic questions.  
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Primary Hypothesis. In line with previous studies, I did find that 
participants preferred more scale points when asked to rate in-group versus out-group 
members (M = 5.51, SD = 1.43 vs. M = 4.90, SD = 1.70; F(1,182) = 6.64, p = .01, np
2 = 
.04, 95% CI [-1.06, -0.14], See Figure 7). Participants also showed a marginally 
significant OHE, indicating that more out-group members indorsed group stereotypes 
than in-group members (M = 74.86, SD = 17.71 vs. M = 71.99, SD = 16.91; F(1,182) = 
3.79, p = .053, np
2 = .02, 95% CI [-5.77, .04], See Figure 8). To determine whether OHE 
was related to scale selection, I ran a correlation with scale selection, perceived in-group 
variability, perceived out-group variability, and perceive difference between out-group 
and in-group variability). Across conditions, scale selection was not correlated with 
perceived in-group variability (r = .06, p = .418), perceived out-group variability (r = 
.08, p = .316), or difference score (r = .02, p = .838). Results were similar when 
correlations were run split by condition. When selecting out-group scales, there were no 
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correlations between scale selection and perceived in-group variability (r = .04, p = 
.709), perceived out-group variability (r = .17, p = .104), or difference score (r = .12, p = 
.262). These correlations were also not significant when selecting in-group scales (r = 
.03, p = .772; r = -.02, p = .864; and r = -.04, p = .714). 
 
 
Figure 7. Amount of evaluative information (in the form of evaluative rating scales) 
sought out as a function of condition in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 8. Perceived variability (in the form of estimated percent endorsement of 
stereotypes) as a function of condition in Experiment 3. 
 
4.2.2 Group Identification. The four group identification measures were 
averaged to form an overall group identification index for both participant’s in-group (α 
= .94) and out-group (α = .97). A Repeated-Measures ANOVA revealed that group 
identity was stronger for the in-group than the out-group (M = 5.81, SD = 1.15 vs. M = 
1.50, SD = 1.05, F(1, 182) = 1189.59, p < .001, np
2 = .87, 95% CI [4.07, 4.56]). To 
examine whether identification with one’s in-group or out-group influenced the effect of 
condition on scale selection, I conduced the same analyses used in Experiment 2a, 2b, 
and 2c. For both models, there was a significant main effect of condition (model 
containing in-group identification: b = 0.60, t(179) = 2.57, p = .011, 95% CI [0.14, 1.07]; 
model containing out-group identification: b = 0.63, t(179) = 2.71, p = .007, 95% CI 
[0.17, 1.10]). There were no significant main effects of in-group or out-group identity 
nor any significant interaction effects.  
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4.2.3 IOS Measures. IOS was measured using a Venn diagram with 
progressively overlapping circles labeled self and group (1 = no overlap to 7 = 
significant overlap). A repeated-measures ANOVA showed that people felt closer to 
their in-group versus their out-group (M = 5.02, SD = 1.50 vs. M = 1.56, SD = 1.08, F(1, 
182) = 649.77, p < .001, np
2 = .78, [3.19, 3.72]). To examine whether perceived 
closeness to one’s in-group or out-group influenced the effect of condition on scale 
selection, I conduced the same analysis used in Experiment 2a, 2b, and 2c. For both 
models, there was a significant main effect of condition (model containing in-group IOS: 
b = 0.60, t(179) = 2.57, p = .011, 95% CI [0.14, 1.07]; model containing out-group IOS: 
b = 0.65, t(179) = 2.77, p = .006, 95% CI [0.19, 1.12]). However, there was no main 
effect of in-group or out-group IOS or a significant interaction effect. 
4.2.4 Time Measure. To test the hypothesis that group membership and time 
identifying with in-group members affected scale selection, I ran a regression with group 
membership and time entered in the first step, and the Group Membership X Time 
interaction term in the second step. The outcome variable was how many scale-points 
participants preferred. Results showed no significant main effects or an interaction 
effect. 
4.2.5 Attitude Measure. Attitude was measured using a sliding scale (range 0 
[Very cold or unfavorable feelings]-100 [Very warm or favorable feelings]). A repeated-
measures ANOVA revealed that attitude was more positive for in-group (vs. out-group) 
members (M = 82.83, SD = 15.04 vs. M = 30.84, SD = 22.24; F(1,182) = 593.96, p < 
.001, np
2 = .77, 95% CI [47.78, 56.20]). To examine whether attitude toward one’s in-
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group or out-group influenced the effect of group membership on scale selection, I 
conduced analyses similar to those used in Experiment 2a, 2b, and 2c. For both models, 
there was a significant main effect of condition (model containing in-group attitude: b = 
0.59, t(179) = 2.49, p = .014, 95% CI [0.12, 1.05]; model containing out-group attitude: 
b = 0.61, t(179) = 2.60, p = .010, 95% CI [0.15, 1.07]). However, there was no main 
effect of in-group or out-group attitude or a significant interaction effect. 
4.3 Discussion 
 Consistent with previous findings, I found that people preferred more scale-
points when asked to evaluate in-group (vs. out-group members). There was also 
evidence of the OHE. Participants believed that out-group members were less variable in 
beliefs than in-group members. However, perceived out-group homogeneity was not 
correlated with scale selection. Additionally, consistent with findings from Experiments 
2a, 2b, and 2c, the preference-categorization effect did not seem to be moderated by 
group identification, time affiliated with the in-group, or attitude toward the in-group or 
out-group.    
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5. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
  Prior research shows that people prefer more nuanced rating scales and see finer 
categorical distinctions for liked versus disliked objects (Smallman & Becker, in press; 
Smallman et al., 2014; Smallman & Roese, 2008, 2009). The current research shows that 
this effect also applies to ratings of people. When asked how many scale points they 
would prefer to have when rating different groups, participants favored more 
differentiated rating scales when evaluating liked (vs. disliked; Experiment 1) and in-
group (vs. out-group; Experiment 2a, 2b, 2c, and 3) members.  
 In Experiment 1, participants created scales with more evaluative scale points for 
liked versus disliked others. However, this result may have been due to easier 
accessibility in memory to relevant category labels or greater vocabulary knowledge for 
evaluating liked (vs. disliked) individuals. Furthermore, I had to exclude 45 participants 
for not following directions (i.e., creating dichotomous scales). Experiments 2a, 2b, and 
2c addressed these problems by including pre-constructed rating scales using the most 
common responses to Experiment 1 that that could be applied across evaluative targets. 
These studies extended finding from previous research by showing the preference-
categorization effect for in-group (vs. out-group) members. Additionally, these studies 
found the preference-categorization effect for several different group types (i.e., 
religious, university, and political affiliation). These groups differed in participants’ 
length of affiliation. Most participants in Experiments 2a and 2c had been affiliated with 
their current religious and political groups for several years. However, sample for 
Experiment 2b consisted of mostly college freshmen who had only been students for a 
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few months. This effect was also consistent across different sample populations (i.e., 
university students and online participants), which greatly differed in age range and 
demographics.  
Experiments 2a, 2b, and 2c also tested two potential factors that might influence 
the preference-categorization effect, group identification and time affiliated with the in-
group.  I hypothesized that the degree to which people identify with in-group or out-
group members may affect the preference-categorization effect. For example, stronger 
association with in-group members may lead to a preference for a more nuanced scale as 
the desire to parse the details of individuals may be stronger. Similarly, stronger 
disassociation from out-group members may lead to a decreased desire to make distinct 
evaluations of those individuals. Thus, greater dissociation may lead to preferences for 
less nuanced scales. However, in the current experiments, these results were 
inconsistent. Experiment 2c found a significant interaction between condition and in-
group identity. The stronger a person’s in-group identity was the more scale points they 
wanted to evaluate in-group members. Yet, there was no effect of in-group identity when 
people evaluated out-group members. Additionally, there was no effect of out-group 
identity on scale selection for in-group or out-group members. Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3 
found no effect of in-group or out-group identity on scale selection for either in-group or 
out-group members nor did any of the current studies show evidence that IOS affected 
the preference-categorization effect. One possible explanation may be that I only 
recruited participants who indicated strong or very strong affiliation with their in-group 
in Experiments 2a, 2c, and 3. This range restriction may have prevented me from finding 
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an effect of affiliation on the preference-categorization effect. However, Experiment 2b 
did not contain this restriction and still found no effect of in-group or out-group identity 
suggesting that these factors do not influence the preference-categorization effect. Future 
research should further investigate the role of group affiliation by recruiting a sample 
with more variability in affiliation strength.  
The second potential mechanism I examined in Experiments 2a, 2b, and 2c was 
time affiliated with the in-group. If the preference-categorization effect is driven by 
increased elaboration of favorable stimuli, then longer engagement with preferred 
stimuli (e.g., in-group members) may influence this effect. This repeated engagement 
may also increase knowledge or expertise about in-group members. Research has shown 
that expertise can induce more nuanced categorization based on deeper level features 
(Chi et al., 1981; Medin et al., 1997; Rota & Zellner, 2007). Similarly, OHE research 
shows that new members to a group can show an in-group homogeneity effect (Ryan & 
Bogart, 1997), suggesting that knowledge and expertise about a group is partially 
responsible for the nuanced distinctions made between in-group members. Therefore, 
people who recently joined a group may not show the preference-categorization effect. I 
found some evidence of this in Experiment 2a, which found that people preferred fewer 
scale points for out-group members the longer they had been affiliated with the in-group. 
Conversely, the number of scale points preferred to evaluate in-group members did not 
change over time. This suggests a derogation of out-group members over time, which 
may lead to a preference for less nuanced scales to evaluate those individuals. However, 
this finding was not evident in Experiment 2b, 2c, or 3. This may be because, although 
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time can influence differentiation in categorization, it may not be necessary for the 
effect to occur. There is some evidence from prior preference-categorization effect 
research suggesting this may be the case. Smallman and Roese (2008) artificially created 
preference in the lab using an associative conditioning paradigm. This demonstrated that 
the preference-categorization effect can occur independently of expertise. Similar 
findings have been demonstrated for the OHE. The cross-race effect states that people 
tend to recognize in-group faces with better accuracy than out-group faces (Meissner & 
Brigham, 2001). While some suggested that this was because of people’s familiarity for 
in-group faces (e.g., being predominantly around same-race others), Bernstein et al. 
(2007) found that, when race was held constant, manipulating university affiliation 
decreased participants’ ability to recognize out-group faces. That is, while expertise can 
influence the OHE, it too can occur independently of expertise. Although we can infer 
independence from pre-existing knowledge, future research could use a minimal groups 
paradigm to determine if the preference-categorization effect occurs when evaluating 
group members in the absence of prior affiliation with the in-group.  
Also included in the current studies were exploratory measures of affect (i.e., 
group level emotions and attitude toward in-group and out-group members). 
Experiments 2a and 2b included measures of group level emotions because prior 
research has shown that low intensity motivation broadens cognitive scope (i.e., global 
focus) while high intensity motivation narrows cognitive scope (i.e., local focus; Gable 
& Harmon-Jones, 2008; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010a; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010b; 
Harmon-Jones et al., 2013; Price & Harmon-Jones, 2010). Thus, high (vs. low) intensity 
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motivation may lead to narrowing of attention and a preference for more nuanced rating 
scales. However, the current studies did not find an effect of emotions on preference-
categorization. An additional measure of affect, attitude toward in-group and out-group 
members, was included in Experiments 2a, 2b, 2c, and 3. Similar to emotions, attitude 
toward in-group or out-group members did not influence the preference categorization 
effect.  
 Given the overlap between the preference-categorization effect and OHE/CRE, 
Experiment 3 included measures of both to determine whether the two measures are 
related. The preference-categorization effect states that people make more nuanced 
distinctions between preferred objects. Similarly, OHE research states that people view 
in-group members as being more variable than out-group members. Disliked objects, 
similarly to out-group members, may be perceived as “all the same”, so finer evaluative 
distinctions are not seen as necessary. Therefore, I believed that the social-cognitive 
theory of the OHE and CRE might also explain the preference-categorization effect. This 
theory states that people broadly categorize out-group members but look for 
individuating features of in-group members (Bodenhausen et al., 2003; Sporer, 2001). 
This partially explains why merely labeling individuals as out-group members can result 
in perceived homogeneity. The way information is evaluated differs from initial 
exposure.  
While people and consumer products are very different, there are some striking 
similarities. Some marketing research suggests that individuals have a tendency to 
anthropomorphize objects by forming relationships with them (Aaker, Fournier, & 
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Brasel, 2004; Fournier, 1998), imagining them having personalities (Aggarwal & 
McGill; 2007; Biel, 2000), and associating them with in-group and out-group members 
(Escalas & Bettman, 2003, 2005). This can lead to positive feelings associated with in-
group brands and dislike for out-group brands.  
In Experiment 3, we found evidence for the preference-categorization effect in 
that people preferred more nuanced scales for in-group (vs. out-group) members. 
Additionally, people demonstrated an OHE by rating out-group (vs. in-group) members 
as being more similar in endorsement of stereotypes. However, I found no relationship 
between the two measures. The current studies included the percent estimate measure of 
OHE because it reliably detects the OHE. A meta-analysis conducted by Boldry, 
Gaertner, & Quinn (2007) suggested that, of the studies they examined, only the percent 
estimate and face recognition tasks reliably detected out-group homogeneity. However, 
other researchers suggest that variability measures can be divided into measures of 
stereotypicality and dispersion, where stereotypicality refers to how well a group fits the 
stereotype and dispersion refers to the deviation from a group’s central tendency (Park & 
Judd, 1990). While both have be shown to detect out-group homogeneity, dispersion 
may be more related to preference-categorization. Additionally, this measure is a within-
subjects difference score (i.e., the OHE measure is calculated by subtracting a 
participant’s in-group variability score from their out-group variability score). However, 
the preference-categorization effect was measured between-subjects. This was done 
because past research using the scale selection task within-subjects has shown a strong 
anchoring or order effect in that people anchor on whatever scale they are given first and 
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select a similar scale for the second scale. For example, if a positive evaluative scale is 
given first, participants will select a more finely differentiated positive evaluative scale 
and then subsequently, select a similarly differentiated negative evaluative scale. 
Additionally, if a negative evaluative scale is given first, participants will select a less 
differentiated negative scale and a similarly constructed positive scale. Future research 
should try using an alternate measure of the OHE (e.g., a dispersion task) to determine 
whether they relate to the preference-categorization effect and develop a more 
appropriate method to measure the preference-categorization effect within-subjects.  
 Another potential explanation is that the specific measure of the preference-
categorization effect used in the current studies does not relate to OHE measures. The 
original studies examining the preference-categorization effect used traditional 
categorization measures (i.e., sorting objects into groups). Studies show that people 
make more nuanced categorical distinctions for liked (vs. disliked) objects (Smallman & 
Roese, 2008). Similarly, studies have tested the preference-categorization effect using 
what we have termed evaluative categorization (i.e., number of nuanced distinctions 
preferred when evaluating objects) and found that people prefer more nuanced 
evaluative scales when rating liked (vs. disliked) objects. However, prior research has 
shown that these two measures are not strongly correlated. Although preference can 
influence differentiation in both traditional and evaluative categorization, individuals 
may not always exhibit both effects. Prior preference-categorization research examining 
the moderating role of need for cognition (NFC) found an effect for both traditional and 
evaluative measures of the preference-categorization effect (Smallman, et al., 2014). 
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However, the two preference-categorization measures were not strongly correlated (r = 
.08, p = .37). Other research has found a similar trend, showing that the preference-
categorization effect is influenced by a person’s tendency to maximize, but only when 
using an evaluative categorization measure (Smallman & Becker, in press). Because the 
OHE has been demonstrated using traditional categorization, we might expect traditional 
preference-categorization measures to correlate with other measures of the OHE even 
though they may not correlate with evaluative categorization measures. Because 
evaluative categorization and traditional categorization are empirically distinct, future 
research should use different measures of preference-categorization (traditional 
categorization as well as other evaluative categorization measures) to determine whether 
there is truly no relationship between the preference-categorization effect and the OHE.   
 Overall, I find that people prefer more nuanced rating scales when evaluating 
liked or in-group members versus disliked or out-group members. While we do not 
always provide formal evaluations of other individuals, the times we do can be impactful 
(e.g., performance appraisals from employers or student evaluations). Knowing that 
people prefer fewer evaluative distinctions for disliked others and out-group members 
presents new questions for how researchers and companies should conduct formal 
evaluations of individuals. 
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APPENDIX 
RATING SCALES FOR SCALE SELECTION TASKS 
 
Scales used to evaluate liked people or in-groups 
Two-point scale: Neutral, Perfect 
Three-point scale: Neutral, Like, Perfect 
Four-point scale: Neutral, Like, Amazing, Perfect 
Five-point scale: Neutral, All Right, Like, Amazing, Perfect 
Six-point scale: Neutral, All Right, Like, Really Like, Amazing, Perfect 
Seven-point scale: Neutral, All Right, Like, Really Like, Amazing, Love, Perfect 
 
Scales used to evaluate disliked people or out-groups 
Two-point scale: Neutral, Worst 
Three-point scale: Neutral, Dislike, Worst 
Four-point scale: Neutral, Dislike, Awful, Worst 
Five-point scale: Neutral, Irritating, Dislike, Awful, Worst 
Six-point scale: Neutral, Irritating, Dislike, Really Dislike, Awful, Worst 
Seven-point scale: Neutral, Irritating, Dislike, Really Dislike, Awful, Hate, Worst 
 
 
